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In this article I consider two consequentialist positions on whether individuals in affluent
countries ought to purchase Fair Trade goods. One is a narrow argument, which asserts
that individuals should purchase Fair Trade goods because this will have positive direct
effects on poverty reduction, by, for example, channelling money into development. I
argue that this justification is insufficient to show that individuals should purchase
Fair Trade goods because individuals could achieve similar results by donating money
to charity and, therefore, without purchasing Fair Trade goods. The second position
has a wider focus. It notes both the direct effects of purchasing Fair Trade goods and
possible indirect effects, such as the impact this might have on other individuals. I
argue that certain actions, of which Fair Trade is one example, will be more likely
to encourage individuals who would not otherwise contribute to poverty reduction to
contribute and that this may produce additional positive value. Although space prohibits
specific conclusions about Fair Trade, I note that considerations of this kind could give us
reason to purchase such goods beyond those that issue from the direct effects of doing so
and that, as such, they are crucial for determining whether individuals should purchase
Fair Trade goods.
INTRODUCTION
Should individuals in affluent countries purchase Fair Trade goods?
What is the connection between individual morality and Fair Trade?
These are amongst the most obvious and pertinent questions one could
ask about Fair Trade given that such goods are typically aimed at
individual consumers and that their central selling point is their ethical
appeal. They are also topical questions which are, unsurprisingly,
attracting increasing attention in literature.
In this article I hope to make some contribution to developing
debate in this area by considering a particular defence of Fair Trade.
The viewpoint I wish to consider is broadly consequentialist. That
is, it defends Fair Trade with reference to good outcomes.1 It is the
argument, often found in public discourse and rhetoric on Fair Trade,
that ‘Fair Trade [sic] offers consumers a powerful way to reduce
poverty’.2
This line of argument could be mobilized in support of Fair Trade
in one of two ways. First, it could appeal solely to the direct effects
1 This is not to say that views other than consequentialism do not value good outcomes;
only that this focus is most typically associated with consequentialism.
2 FLO, ‘What is Fairtrade?’, <http://www.fairtrade.net/what_is_fairtrade.html>
(2010).
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of purchasing Fair Trade goods. For example, it might be argued that
purchasing Fair Trade goods is valuable because doing this transfers
wealth to individuals who live in poverty, wealth which will alleviate
their plight somewhat. Let us call this the narrow consequentialist
justification (NCJ). Alternatively, the argument could be given a wider
focus. It might be thought, for example, that purchasing Fair Trade
goods helps transfer wealth to those in poverty and that it has some
indirect effect, such as prompting others to contribute to poverty
relief, which is also of positive value. The argument, then, would be
that purchasing Fair Trade goods is valuable given this tout court
contribution to poverty relief. Let us call this the wide consequentialist
justification (WCJ).
Working from within a consequentialist perspective I make two sets
of arguments about these justifications for Fair Trade.
First, I focus on the NCJ, entering an existing debate which pits
Hassoun and Philips in defence against Kurjanska and Risse in
critique. Although I challenge certain specifics of their argument, I
argue that Kurjanska and Risse’s position seems the more plausible.
Second, however, I argue that the focus of Hassoun, Philips, and
Kurjanska and Risse on the NCJ is something of a mistake and that,
as such, although Kurjanska and Risse’s position on it seems more
tenable, this represents a rather hollow victory. I argue, rather, that the
question of whether an individual should purchase Fair Trade goods
cannot be answered without considering the WCJ. I show this with an
example, demonstrating that actions which exhibit certain properties –
to wit, those which are suitably public and which garner wide support
from a population – will be more conducive to prompting others to act in
desirable ways and that this indirect effect can be of great significance
in determining the overall impact of our actions. I then argue that since
Fair Trade goods exhibit these properties, the purchase of such goods
might be one case where this point has application. My conclusions
are somewhat qualified since Fair Trade is not unique in exhibiting
these properties, but my arguments should show there can be reasons
to purchase Fair Trade goods beyond the direct effects of doing so and
that further discussion of this subject should focus on the WCJ.
THE NARROW CONSEQUENTIALIST JUSTIFICATION
In the introduction to this article I noted a common way to argue for
Fair Trade. This is the thought that individuals should purchase Fair
Trade goods because doing so helps poverty relief. When advocates
deploy this argument they usually appeal to only the direct effects
of purchasing such goods. Public discourse emphasizes points such
as providing producers with income sufficient to cover the costs of
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sustainable production or the channelling of funds into community
development projects, such as education and health care.3 Similarly,
in both Hassoun’s and Philips’s recent defences of Fair Trade, the
emphasis is on how it increases the wages of producers, reduces their
economic vulnerability, helps them tomeet their basic needs, and allows
them to educate their children better.4 In using this basis to argue that
‘there is a strong case for a moral duty to buy Fair Trade products’,
these arguments appeal to the NCJ.5 The idea, in essence, is that
individuals should act so as to reduce poverty and that since purchasing
Fair Trade goods reduces poverty directly by, say, channelling money
into development, individuals should purchase Fair Trade goods.
There are three ways in which this argument could be challenged.
Onewould be to deny that individuals should act so as to reduce poverty.
This is not an indisputable claim, but it is fairly uncontroversial, so I
will bypass it here.
Second, the empirical premise of the argument – the claim that
individuals can reduce poverty by purchasing Fair Trade goods – could
be challenged. It can be challenged in one of two ways. First, it could
be argued that Fair Trade has a directly negative effect, perhaps for
those involved in Fair Trade networks or those excluded from them.
Second, it could be argued that Fair Trade’s long-term impact will
be negative. Some have argued, for instance, that Fair Trade creates
artificial markets by offering incentives to produce, say, coffee even
though market prices show that it is already over-supplied.6 Others
have argued that Fair Trade ties producers to unstable markets, such
as primary goods production.7
There is not space here to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the
impact of Fair Trade, but my sense is that Fair Trade has answered
its critics on these matters. There is now a sizeable literature on the
beneficial contribution Fair Trade has made to poverty reduction for
3 See, for example, FLO, ‘What is Fairtrade?’.
4 N. Hassoun, ‘Making Free Trade Fair’, Carnegie Mellon Department of Philosophy
Working Paper Series, Paper 356, <http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=1357&context=philosophy> (2011), pp. 15–19; J. Philips, ‘Is There a Moral Case for
Fair Trade Products? On the Moral Duty for Consumers to buy and for Governments
to Support Fair Trade Products’, The Impact of Fair Trade, ed. R. Ruben (Wageningen,
2008), pp. 240–3.
5 Philips, ‘Is There a Moral Case for Fair Trade Products?’, p. 249.
6 See, for example, B. Lindsay, ‘Grounds for Complaint? Understanding the Coffee
Crisis’, Paper for the Centre for Trade Policy Studies, 16 <http://www.freetrade.org/
pubs/briefs/tbp-016.pdf > (2003).
7 See, for example, M. S. LeClair, ‘Fighting the Tide: Alternative Trade Organisations
in the Era of Global Free Trade’, World Development 30.6 (2002), pp. 949–58; M.
Kurjanska and M. Risse, ‘Fairness in Trade II: Export Subsidies and the Fair Trade
Movement’, PPE 7.1 (2008), pp. 45–6.
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both Fair Trade workers and many beyond these networks.8 Responses
have also been given to worries over Fair Trade’s long-term impact.9
The artificial markets challenge is faulty because it neglects to note
that Fair Trade is a brand and is, therefore, separated from the wider
coffee market. Ultimately, Fair Trade caters to a niche market and is
sustainable so long as demand meets supply within that market. It
cannot create artificial markets for coffee in general any more than
Rolex watches create artificial markets for watches in general. The
argument that Fair Trade ties producers to unstable primary goods
production is faulty, because it ignores strategies employed by Fair
Trade to avoid this problem, notably the assistance offered to enable
business diversification both horizontally – to production of other
goods – and vertically – to the manufacturing stages of production
(such as the roasting of coffee beans), which capture higher returns
and suffer less from market fluctuations. Of course, all this research
could be questioned, but given the available evidence, it seems safe to
assume that purchasing Fair Trade goods does contribute positively to
poverty reduction.
The third option for challenging the NCJ is what we might call
‘the comparative challenge’.10 The comparative challenge accepts that
purchasing Fair Trade goods will reduce poverty. However, it highlights
that purchasing Fair Trade goods is not the only way, nor necessarily
the best way, one could achieve this goal. For example, one can also
reduce poverty by donating money to Oxfam or UNICEF. So, we
‘must think of Fair Trade’, as Kurjanska and Risse put it, as only
‘one possible development strategy’.11 The problem this creates for the
NCJ is simple. If similar outcomes could be achieved by other means,
consequentialists do not havemuch reason to value the purchase of Fair
Trade goods in particular. Theymay still think that the purchase of Fair
Trade goods is a worthy action. But since theirmain interest, at least on
the terms of theNCJ, is what individuals directly contribute to poverty
relief, they are likely to feel largely indifferent towards individuals
8 This research is nicely summarized in Hassoun, ‘Making Free Trade Fair’, pp. 15–19.
See also the collection of articles in The Impact of Fair Trade, ed. R. Ruben (Wageningen,
2008).
9 See M. A. Littrell and M. A. Dickson, Social Responsibility in the Global Market: Fair
Trade of Cultural Products (London, 1999), pp. 61–112; S. Mohan, Fair Trade without
the Froth: A Dispassionate Economic Analysis of ‘Fair Trade’ (London, 2010), pp. 34–46.
10 I should note that I have explored the comparative challenge in detail elsewhere
(A. Walton, ‘The Common Arguments for Fair Trade’, Political Studies, forthcoming). An
argument with a similar thrust can also be found in Kurjanska and Risse, ‘Fairness in
Trade II’, pp. 43–9. As such, what follows is a stylized version of the argument, shortened
to allow space for the other arguments of this article. I refer readers who desire more
detail to the above texts.
11 Kurjanska and Risse, ‘Fairness in Trade II’, pp. 46–7.
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who do not purchase Fair Trade goods provided that these individuals
undertake other actions that will have a similar effect. They certainly
would be unlikely to conclude that individuals ought to purchase Fair
Trade goods, at least in the strong sense of the word ‘ought’.
Hassoun has responded to Kurjanska and Risse’s statement of this
challenge by arguing that empirical evidence is needed to determine
whether the objection succeeds.12 As the argument relies on the factual
claim that other actions would have similar effects, this is true.
However, Hassoun rather underestimates the challenge. Her approach
of demonstrating Fair Trade’s record in poverty relief is not sufficient
to refute it. Nor is it enough to show that Fair Trade has a generally
better record than aid or than certain charities. In all of these cases
the comparative challenge can be restated with reference to specific
charities – to wit, those with better records. Rather, in order to refute
the challenge whilst retaining the focus of the NCJ, it must be shown
that, in terms of directly reducing poverty, purchasing Fair Trade goods
is an irreplaceable action. It remains an empirical question whether or
not this is the case. However, the sheer magnitude of what would be
required to rebut the comparative challenge surely suggests it should
be deemed prima facie to refute the NCJ.
Now, it is important to clarify what this shows. It does not give us
reason to condemn Fair Trade. In some instances Fair Trade may be
an optimal poverty reduction strategy and in most cases purchasing
Fair Trade goods and donating to charity will probably have similar
direct effects. As such, even in light of the comparative challenge, a
consequentialist should view Fair Trade as, at least, one acceptable
way to contribute directly to reducing poverty.
Kurjanska and Risse conclude that since the best strategy for poverty
relief depends on context, ‘while sometimes there is a rightful claim on
consumers to buy Fair Trade products, other times there is not’.13 This,
I think, is not quite right. Few consequentialists think that assessing
every action on its individual merits is what consequentialism requires.
Imperfect information and time-constraints are just two reasons why
this is not optimal from a consequentialist perspective. Given these
limitations, often the best policy is to adopt a general practice that,
on average, will be conducive to promoting the good. This is often how
consequentialists defend the idea of rights. With similar reasoning,
it might be argued that since Fair Trade can be deemed a generally
profitable poverty reduction strategy, undertaking a general practice of
purchasing Fair Trade goods would be reasonable.
12 Hassoun, ‘Making Free Trade Fair’, p. 6.
13 Kurjanska and Risse, ‘Fairness in Trade II’, p. 48.
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Nevertheless, what I think the comparative challenge does show is
that if we consider only the direct effects, there is no reason to adopt
a general practice of purchasing Fair Trade goods as opposed to, say, a
general practice of donating money to charity. Since both are likely to
produce positive direct results, both are acceptable general practices,
but since they are likely to produce similar results, this perspective
gives no obvious reason to favour one over the other. With respect to
the choice between these options, Kurjanska and Risse are right in
saying that to argue that individuals ought to purchase Fair Trade, it
is not enough to note that doing so directly reduces poverty; one must
also show it passes ‘the test of being a development strategy superior
to . . . available alternatives’.14 Since it seems unlikely that this will be
the case in all, or even many, scenarios, they are also right to conclude
that emphasis on how one can directly reduce poverty – that is, the
approach of the NCJ – is insufficient to show that individuals ought to
purchase Fair Trade goods, at least in a strong sense.
THE WIDE CONSEQUENTIALIST JUSTIFICATION
In closing their article, Kurjanska and Risse write that, beyond the
question of direct contribution to development, ‘it is hard to see how to
make [Fair Trade’s] case stronger’.15 If this were true, discussion of Fair
Trade could end with the conclusion noted above: that Fair Trade is, at
best, one way to meet an imperfect duty to relieve poverty. However,
Kurjanska and Risse’s statement seems false to me. Indeed, my sense
is that not only are the issues raised by the NCJ not all we can say
about Fair Trade, but that focus only on the NCJ is not even able to
answer the question of whether individuals should purchase Fair Trade
goods.
In this section I aim to show this by highlighting that there are many
matters of interest to a consequentialist beyond the direct effects of our
actions and that these matters are of clear relevance to the question of
Fair Trade. I will not attempt to develop an argument for the precise
conclusion that individuals should purchase Fair Trade goods because
my arguments on the importance of the indirect effects of our actions
require the majority of the space available. So, I will limit myself to
demonstrating this point, highlighting its relevance to Fair Trade, and
concluding that the question of whether individuals should purchase
Fair Trade goods can be answered only with reference to the WCJ.
14 Kurjanska and Risse, ‘Fairness in Trade II’, p. 45.
15 Kurjanska and Risse, ‘Fairness in Trade II’, p. 49.
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The argument I will offer has three premises:
1. Some actions will be more likely than others to prompt
contributions to poverty relief from individuals who would not
otherwise contribute.
2. Undertaking these actions is more likely to result in a higher
contribution to poverty relief and, therefore, should be deemed
preferable from a consequentialist perspective.
3. Purchasing Fair Trade goods might be considered one such
action.
These three premises will occupy me over the next three subsections
respectively. I will then respond to some objections before concluding.
Encouraging contributions
The starting point for my argument is to highlight an issue that
presumably is widely known: that there are some individuals around
us who do not contribute to poverty relief. That such individuals exist
in all affluent countries is something that requires little evidence.
In addition, note that, for each non-contributor, there is a psycho-
logical aspect to his or her behaviour. For example, research shows
that many do not contribute because they require some assurance that
others are doing likewise and they do not feel that they have this
assurance.16 It is also undoubtedly the case that some do not contribute
for self-interested reasons. There are presumably other reasons as well.
These factors are important because they highlight an opportunity
for encouraging non-contributors to contribute. If conditional
contributors can be assured that others are making a contribution,
they will be encouraged to contribute.17 Similarly, if we can structure
the circumstances of a self-interested person such that making a
contribution becomes worthwhile for selfish reasons, she may be
encouraged to contribute.
Howmight we take advantage of this opportunity? Of course, numer-
ous things might encourage contributions. Here, I will concentrate on
one: the way in which our actions can encourage others to contribute.
It is evidently the case that our behaviour can prompt actions from
others. This is shown from large-scale scenarios, where social etiquette
can structure how individuals act, to small-scale scenarios, such as the
way in which people often mirror each other’s body language.
Further, it is undoubtedly the case that an action with certain
features will be more likely to affect others. Two such conditions are
16 This research is summarized in P. Singer, The Life You Can Save: How to Do Your
Part to End World Poverty (New York, 2010), pp. 64–5.
17 See Singer, The Life You Can Save, pp. 64–5.
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as follows. First, it must be an action that non-contributors believe
contributes to a goal. Call this the subjectivity condition. Second, it
must be an action that attracts appropriate attention. Call this the
publicity condition.
To demonstrate the importance of these conditions, consider an
example. Imagine that there is a local play-area for families and that
it requires the contributions of a number of individuals to keep it in
good condition. There are two individuals, Clive and Deborah. Both are
willing to contribute. However, Deborah is a conditional contributor.
She feels that it would be unfair for her to contribute if others do
not. As such, she will contribute only if she is assured that others are
contributing.
Now consider Clive’s options. Imagine that Clive can undertake one
of two actions: ‘mending broken playground rides’ or ‘making a financial
donation’. One issue Clive must consider is whether these actions do
make a genuine contribution to maintaining the play-area. If an action
does not meet this condition, undertaking the action will be of little use.
But let us imagine that both actions do meet this condition. Once this
is established, it is also worth considering the subjectivity and publicity
conditions.
Suppose, for example, that Deborah believes making a financial
contribution does not constitute a genuine contribution, perhaps
because she feels that it is not in keeping with the spirit of the project.
In this instance, if Clive acts by making a financial contribution,
he will not have much chance of prompting Deborah’s contribution.
Since she does not believe that this constitutes a contribution, she will
perceive his action as inaction. She will not be assured that others are
contributing and she will not contribute. Similarly, imagine that one’s
only means of making a financial contribution is very secretive. In
this instance, again, Clive can have little effect on Deborah by making
a financial contribution. Without evidence of Clive’s contribution,
Deborah is unlikely to have the assurance she desires and she will
not contribute. In both instances, Clive can hope to have an influence
on Deborah only if he mends broken rides.
The same seems true for scenarios involving non-contributors with
other motivations. Just as in the case of conditional contributors, it is
difficult to see how any individual would be encouraged to contribute
by others taking actions which she does not believe constitute
contributions or of which she does not have knowledge. Inversely, if any
action is to encourage her to contribute, it must have these features.
Note also that an action meeting the publicity condition could have
an impact in terms of altering the social atmosphere. For example, if
Clive mends broken rides within the view of Deborah and an audience
of others, it might create some social pressure on Deborah to do the
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same. Many social conventions work in this way. Group tipping in
restaurants is a good example. Similarly, Deborah might feel more
inclined to contribute because she observes the gratitude shown to
Clive by others and she perceives an opportunity to curry favour with
them. Contributing in private, on the other hand, can have none of
these effects.
Itmust be admitted that there is no certainty that actions whichmeet
the subjectivity and publicity conditionswill prompt contributions from
non-contributors. In addition, it should be acknowledged that the extent
to which actions meet these conditions might be a matter of degree. A
lot may depend on context. I will return to these matters below.
For the moment, though, I hope I have shown that, at least ceteris
paribus, actions which have these features will stand a higher chance
of prompting contributions from non-contributors than actions which
do not have these features.
Consequentialism and indirect effects
The second point I wish to make in this section is that in scenarios,
such as our own, where there is a group of non-contributors, the impact
of one’s actions on advancing goals such as poverty reduction can vary
considerably to the extent that these actions meet the subjectivity and
publicity conditions. In particular, if some actionsmeet these conditions
to a greater extent than other actions, the former have a higher chance
of bringing about a greater overall contribution to poverty reduction.
To demonstrate this, imagine two people: Alan and Betty. Alan is
considering how to reduce poverty. Betty is a non-contributor. Alan
has two actions available to him: X and Y. Let us assume that actions
X and Y both have a similar direct impact (of value N) on advancing
poverty reduction, but that action Xmeets the subjectivity and publicity
conditions to a greater extent than Y. Now, as noted above, it is not the
case that actions meeting the subjectivity and publicity conditions will
necessarily prompt the contributions of others. It must also be noted
that the actions will meet the conditions by matters of degree and so
both will have some probability of prompting a contribution. However,
what was argued above is that actions meeting the subjectivity and
publicity conditions to a greater extent will have a higher probability
of prompting a contribution. We acknowledge this by assigning a
probability to the likelihood of action X prompting Betty’s contribution
(P) and assigning a probability to the likelihood of action Y prompting
her contribution (Q) and by assuming that the probability assigned to
X, which meets the subjectivity and publicity conditions to a greater
extent, is higher than that assigned to Y (that is, that P > Q). In this
scenario, the overall expected utility of Alan’s action is as follows:
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Table 1. The effect of indirect effects
A’s action
A’s direct
impact B’s action
B’s direct
impact
Total
contribution
X N PX PN N(1+P)
Y N QY QN N(1+Q)
What this table shows is the following. In a world, such as our
own, where a number of non-contributors exist, some actions can be
expected to produce utilities beyond their direct effects. In particular,
some actions, such as actions which meet the subjectivity and publicity
conditions to a greater extent, have a higher probability of also
prompting non-contributors to contribute to poverty relief than other
actions. Consequently, undertaking these actions can be expected to
bring about a higher overall contribution to poverty relief than actions
with lower chances of having these effects.
The implications of this point for a consequentialist perspective are
irresistible. If two actions have similar direct effects, but one has a
higher chance of bringing about valuable indirect effects and, therefore,
can be deemed to have a higher expected utility, a consequentialist
should opt for this action.
With this point in mind, let us return to the question of Fair Trade.
Agreement, publicity, and Fair Trade
The final stage of my argument involves highlighting that Fair Trade
meets the subjectivity and publicity conditions fairly well.
It meets the publicity condition in a fairly obvious sense. The
typical sites of Fair Trade consumption are public forums, such as the
supermarket or coffee shops. In addition, Fair Trade has particular
ways of attracting attention. By placing the Fair Trade label on certain
goods, Fair Trade attempts to portray the image that one chooses either
the fair option or the unfair option. The juxtaposition this creates gives
a certain salience to Fair Trade goods. This is undoubtedly beneficial
in terms of catching the attention of others.
There is also evidence to suggest that Fair Trade meets the
subjectivity condition. For example, it is of note that both the
recognition of the Fair Trade label and the popularity of Fair Trade
have risen steadily over the last twenty years, including continuing
to rise even during recession.18 It is also of note that opinion polls
18 See Fairtrade Foundation, ‘Global Fairtrade sales increase by 22%’, <http://www.
fairtrade.org.uk/press_office/press_releases_and_statements/jun_2009/global_fairtrade_
sales_increase_by_22.aspx> (2009) and D. Milmo, ‘Fairtrade’s Annual Sales Defy
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confirm that Fair Trade is popular amongst consumers.19 None of this
specifically shows that purchasing Fair Trade goods is the subject of an
all-encompassing consensus, but it does suggest that Fair Trade meets
the subjectivity condition reasonably well.
It is important to note that Fair Trade is not unique inmeetings these
conditions. For example, there are various ways of donating money to
charity that are fairly public, such as droppingmoney into charity boxes
on the street or in the supermarket.
However, it is also important to note that there are forms of
charitable giving that clearly do not satisfy the subjectivity and
publicity conditions. For example, online donations and direct debit
payments will not meet the publicity condition to any great extent.
There is also evidence that a notable percentage of people object to the
high administrative costs of aid.20 This might suggest that donations
to large, bureaucratic charities will not meet the subjectivity condition
very well.21
There is also evidence that a higher proportion of the UK population
deem fairer trading an appropriate response to poverty than think this
about donating to charity.22 This might even suggest that purchasing
Fair Trade goods meets the subjectivity condition to a greater extent
than donating to charity quite generally.
At any rate, what we can certainly deduce is that the purchase of Fair
Trade goods is amongst a set of actions that will be clearly superior to
at least some other forms of contributing to poverty relief in terms of
meeting the subjectivity and publicity conditions. What follows from
this is that there is a set of actions, of which purchasing Fair Trade
goods is one example, that can be more readily expected to generate
Recession to Pass £1bn’, The Guardian, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/
feb/28/fairtrade-sales-rise-despite-recession> (2011).
19 See, for example, IGD, ‘Interest in Fair Trade Doubles’, <http://www.igd.com/
index.asp?id=1&fid=6&sid=25&cid=200> (2008).
20 Ipsos MORI, ‘A Survey of Public Attitudes to the Charity Commis-
sion’,<http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/1767/A-Survey-
of-Public-Attitudes-to-the-Charity-Commission.aspx> (1999).
21 One objection that might be raised here is that larger, more bureaucratic
charities can be more cost-effective owing to economies of scale, thus offsetting
the disvalue of not garnering widespread popularity. For what it is worth,
my understanding is that in practice these charities are not usually more
efficient. On this see Giving What We Can, ‘Recommended Charities’, <http://www.
givingwhatwecan.org/resources/recommended-charities.php> (2011) and Giving What
We Can, ‘Charity Comparisons’, <http://www.givingwhatwecan.org/resources/charity-
comparisons.php> (2011). However, as I will highlight in the next section, even if this
objection is accurate, it does not undermine my broader arguments.
22 M. B. Brown, Fair Trade: Reform and Realities in the International Trading System
(London, 1993), p. 180; K. Bird and D. Hughes, ‘Ethical Consumerism: The Case of
“Fairly-Traded” Coffee’, Business Ethics: A European Review 6.3 (1997), pp. 159–67, at
161.
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indirect contributions to poverty relief than another set of actions.
Moreover, if the arguments of the first section of this article – that in
most instances, donations to charity and purchases of Fair Trade goods
will have similar direct effects – are correct, these indirect effects would
mean that these actions could be expected to generate higher overall
utility. This would be sufficient to show that a consequentialist should
say that individuals ought to opt for them in the strong sense of the
word ‘ought’.
Response to objections
I do not have space to consider all of the objections that could be levelled
againstmy arguments here. Instead Iwill consider three that have been
raised regularly.
The first is the question of whether any individual actions really
could prompt others into action. One reason why they might not is that
observation of individual actions might not be sufficient to provide, say,
individuals seeking assurance with stable knowledge that ‘others’ are
contributing, as opposed to simply one or two other individuals.
My response to this is to deny that these two issues can be
distinguished in this fashion, at least in terms of the usual inferences
we make about behaviour patterns. Most belief about behaviour
patterns is based on observing a number of individuals undertaking an
action and drawing inferences. For example, my belief that Coca-Cola
is widely purchased is based primarily on hearing a number of others
ordering it. Similarly, if people overhear a number of others ordering
Fair Trade coffee on a regular basis, it is likely that they will infer from
this that these are regular Fair Trade consumers and, if the Coca-Cola
example holds, the belief that Fair Trade is widely purchased.
Here a second objection may be raised. One problem with inferring
conformity with a practice from what happens in one’s local coffee shop,
it might be thought, is that here, and more generally, I move within a
specific population demographic. The main worry that this might be
thought to raise for my view is that since people move in different
demographic contexts and will witness and be influenced mainly by
peer groups, purchasing Fair Trade goods, for instance, will not have
an impact across demographic boundaries.
I should say that I doubt demographic separation is this strict in
most affluent countries. There is certainly no problem establishing
many other behaviour patterns across these demographics.23 Even if
demographic separation is this strict, though, it does not affect my
argument since the case in favour of public donations to charity and
23 On this see J. Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order (Cambridge,
1989).
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Fair Tradewould still holdwithin demographic groups.Moreover, it will
remain the case that, if any actions are likely to influence others outside
one’s peer group, it is likely to be actions that meet the subjectivity and
publicity conditions to a higher extent. As such, the central thrust of
my argument appears to have application even in this scenario.
The final objection that must be noted here is the claim that my
arguments are too theoretical. Of course, ultimately, whether the above
considerations on indirect effects demonstrate that purchasing Fair
Trade goods (or undertaking another of the actions within its set) is
the best way to reduce poverty tout court requires numerous empirical
calculations that have been omitted here. It might still be possible
that donations to certain charities will be so directly effective that
this outweighs the indirect benefits of contributing to poverty relief
publically or that informing others that one donates to charity privately
would be sufficient to provide assurance to conditional contributors.
For what it is worth, I do not think that these objections succeed.
For the reasons I noted above, my sense is that the direct effects of
purchasing Fair Trade goods and donating to various charities will
often be similar, at least over time. Similarly, I doubt that those
seeking assurance of the contribution of others will find discussion of
contributions as assuring as observation of them. This would suggest
that public actions are still more likely to prompt the contribution of
others.
Nevertheless, I will leave these objections unanswered in the strict
sense because even if they are accurate, my arguments still show that
one cannot determine how one should act from a consequentialist
perspective without at least considering the indirect effects of our
actions. For example, it would be impossible to know whether donating
to charity is so directly effective that it outweighs the benefits of
purchasing Fair Trade goods without calculating the direct and indirect
benefits of both. What follows from this is that work focused only on the
NCJ is simply unable to address the question of whether individuals
should purchase Fair Trade goods from a consequentialist perspective
adequately. As such, in conclusion, I submit that future work must
consider the question from the perspective of the wide consequentialist
justification.24
andrew.walton@unisg.ch
24 I owe thanks to an audience at the University of Warwick’s Centre for Ethics, Law,
and Public Affairs for comments on an earlier draft of this article and special thanks to
Matthew Clayton, Chloe´ Lewis and Dorothea Baur for extensive discussion of it.
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